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USSR-Czechoslovakia: A high-ranking Soviet official arrived in Prague yesterday, presumably to monitor the progress of Czechoslovakia's "normalization."

According to a Western news service, Vasily Kuznetsov, Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and a CPSU central committee member, was sent as the Kremlin's envoy in response to a request by the Czechoslovaks. They were said to have asked for a Soviet emissary with authority to make political decisions about the implementation of measures which would permit the evacuation of troops. Despite Prague's wish to expedite a withdrawal, it is highly unlikely that Moscow has delegated to Kuznetsov any such discretionary authority.

Shortly after his arrival Kuznetsov met with President Svoboda. According to Radio Czechoslovakia they had an "exchange of views and information," language suggesting disagreement over the course of Prague's efforts. The Soviet envoy's arrival in the Czechoslovak capital came amid unconfirmed reports of a meeting of the Czechoslovak central committee and evidence of Soviet impatience with the pace and extent of Prague's return to orthodoxy.

Pravda on 6 September said that despite "serious successes" in the Czechoslovak economy, changes in "political and public life" were "only in the initial stages" and that a "correct understanding" of normalization was still lacking. To achieve normalization, Prague was advised to expose and rout "right-wing antisocialist forces" completely, to end their influence on youth, and to strengthen the guiding role of the Communist Party in the entire life of the country.

A Bulgarian military paper reportedly stated yesterday that any expectations that troops of the Warsaw Pact will withdraw soon from Czechoslovakia]

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[are "unrealistic." The paper reportedly claimed that reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries desire a quick withdrawal so that they can have "another swing at it."

In still another apparent effort to accommodate the Soviets, two non-Communist political organizations, the Club of Committed Non-Party People and K-231, an association of rehabilitated political prisoners, have been banned. The Ministry of Interior ruled on 5 September that the former association has the "character of a political organization" and therefore cannot be accepted. The latter organization was described as "superfluous" because the Communist Party - dominated National Front will handle cases of people wrongly imprisoned.

There has been no significant change in the disposition of occupying forces in Czechoslovakia. Preparations appear under way, however, for an airlift of some Soviet troops out of the Prague area. The US defense attaché in his latest report from Prague stated that there now are an estimated 7,500 Soviet troops at the Prague airport.

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[Vietnam:

South Vietnam: The low level of enemy-initiated military activity throughout the country continues.

Sharp and prolonged ground fighting occurred on 5 and 6 September at two points south and northwest of Saigon as a result of allied initiatives.

In most of northern I Corps, severe weather conditions centered in the Da Nang area have sharply curtailed both allied and Communist military operations. Heavy rains and high winds almost certainly will delay and may cancel some enemy offensive plans in the northern provinces.

North Vietnam: The Communists are keeping up a steady stream of propaganda on the US elections and antiwar sentiment in the United States. The thrust of the message is that the recent nominating conventions proved nothing and that any US administration eventually will have to bow to those forces opposing the war and seek a political solution. The latest propaganda pitch along these lines in the North Vietnamese party paper on 6 September closely paralleled remarks in Premier Pham Van Dong's National Day speech and the Communist presentation at the Paris talks this week.

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UN-Czechoslovakia: Pressure to keep the Czechoslovak issue alive at the UN now is focusing on the General Assembly.

A number of members, including Canada, Britain, Brazil, Yugoslavia and Chile, are concerned that the UN not appear paralyzed on the matter. Because the Czechoslovaks would presumably be under Soviet compulsion to repudiate a call for an emergency session or placing on the agenda of the regular session an item dealing specifically with the occupation, other means to deal with the issue are being considered.

A Yugoslav representative at the UN has suggested inscription of an item which, without naming Czechoslovakia, would provide an umbrella for discussion of the situation. He noted that this indirect approach must have the broadest support including nonaligned countries to avoid its being interpreted as a "cold war" gambit.

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Communist China: Radical Red Guards and other "revolutionary" organizations are under increasingly heavy attacks, apparently designed to eliminate them as forces capable of conducting Cultural Revolution.

Local authorities in some areas are vigorously enforcing a new mandate for restoring order and are using it to destroy the Red Guard leadership and terrorize its rank and file. In many areas, those in authority now are military men who had been persistently attacked by radical Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. These former targets now may feel free to retaliate for the first time.

First-hand reports from Dairen and Canton confirm that the crackdown now is going considerably beyond the bland disciplinary measures called for in Peking's recent propaganda. Former Red Guards are being paraded, forced to carry signs labeling them "counterrevolutionary," and sometimes beaten and whipped in public. Reports from Canton suggest that at times a lynch atmosphere exists, in which "the masses" are incited to carry out executions themselves. In Canton, army troops are usually observed to be supervising or participating in such acts of suppression.

Many older students are being rounded up and given "job assignments" to mines currently operated by prisoners and to army-run farms.

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So-called "worker propaganda teams," led by army troops, have been formed in all major cities to occupy schools and subdue Red Guards. Individual teams often have more than a thousand participants. Propaganda statements stigmatizing students

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in general as "bourgeois intellectuals" will probably encourage these teams.

The process of forming new provincial governments, renewed in mid-August after two and a half months of inaction, was completed on 5 September with the announcement of new revolutionary committees in Tibet and Sinkiang. The new leaders are mostly old-line military men with a few party officials also included, as was the case with other recently formed provincial governments.

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Malaysia-Philippines: Relations between the two countries are again worsening.

On 4 September, Kuala Lumpur sent a note to Manila warning, in effect, that a break in relations might result if President Marcos signs legislation on territorial seas which reserves the Philippine claim to Sabah. Marcos apparently will not act immediately, referring the bill to his Foreign Policy Council for consideration. He appears, however, to have little choice but to sign.

If the bill does become law, the Philippine Government appears to hope that Malaysia will protest the section on Sabah when the document is deposited with the UN Secretary General. This would open the way for the Philippines to bring the Sabah dispute before the UN, a step Malaysia has sought to avoid.

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Sweden: The national elections on 15 September are expected to offer the non-Socialist parties their first real opportunity in recent years to challenge effectively the Social Democrats' decades-long control of the government.

Early public opinion polls show the three non-Socialist opposition parties--the Liberals, Conservatives, and the Center--in a slight lead for control of the 233-seat lower chamber of the Riksdag. All signs now point to a close contest. On the far left, the small but vigorous Communist Party has enjoyed considerable success in cultivating an image of liberalism and independence from Moscow, and appears to be making some inroads into the Social Democrats' traditional sources of support. The Czechoslovak crisis, however, has probably hurt the Communists despite their vehement attacks on Moscow.

The Social Democrats, in power for some 35 years, have seen a small but steady erosion of their voter strength in recent years. This results largely from the lack of vital domestic issues and from the movement further to the left of young voters who believe that the party has run out of ideas.

Prime Minister Erlander and the party leadership have sought to win the support of youth and the more radical elements by focusing on foreign policy issues of little direct interest to Sweden. Foremost among these issues has been the US involvement in Vietnam.

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